

Secure system access with SSH

HPC Café

2024-04-09




SSH overview

SSH is a cryptographic **network protocol**


- Designed in 1995 by Tatu Ylönen (researcher at Helsinki University of Technology, Finland)
- SSH is standardized by an **Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)** working group
- **OpenSSH** (an OpenBSD project) is the most common Open Source implementation
 - Available on Linux, Windows, MacOS
- Recommended **Windows** client:
MobaXterm Home Edition
<https://mobaxterm.mobatek.net/download-home-edition.html>

SSH: How does it work?

- “Secure” means
 - User is authenticated to the system
 - System is authenticated to the user
 - All transmitted data is encrypted
- Technology
 - Asymmetric encryption algorithm („Public Key“) for authentication and determination of a session key
 - Symmetric encryption of data transfer using the session key



SSH: How does it work?



Questions (& quick answers)

- How do I **make** a public/private key **pair**?
 - `ssh-keygen`
- How do I store the **private** key?
 - Encrypted, on your local system
- **How many key pairs** do I need?
 - One for each client computer
- **Where** do I put the **public** key?
 - In an appropriate place on the remote system
- Can I **transfer files**, too?
 - Yes, with `scp` (and other tools)
- How do I connect **from A to C via B with least hassle**?
 - Via “proxy jump”

How to make a key pair

Accepted key formats (by us):
RSA (at least 4096 bit)
ECDSA (at least 512 bit)
ED25519

- Recommended options for key generation:

```
$ ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096 [-f outfile]
```

of bits in key

Type of key

Where the
key(s) go(es)

- Standard files and location:


```
$ ls -l ~/.ssh
```

```
-rw----- 1 unrz55 unrz 1766 Apr 10 2023 id_rsa  
-rw-r--r-- 1 unrz55 unrz 395 Apr 10 2023 id_rsa.pub
```

Handling the private key(s)

- The private key is **secret!**
Anyone who has your private key can log in as you
- When generating the key pair, you are **asked for a passphrase**
 - This is how your private key is protected (encrypted)
 - It is still a good idea to protect the key from others
- If a **client is compromised**, assume that the **private key is exposed**
 - Use **one key pair per distinct client system**

Choosing a passphrase (or any password)



~28 BITS OF ENTROPY

$2^{28} = 3 \text{ DAYS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$


(PLAUSIBLE ATTACK ON A WEAK REMOTE WEB SERVICE. YES, CRACKING A STOLEN HASH IS FASTER, BUT IT'S NOT WHAT THE AVERAGE USER SHOULD WORRY ABOUT.)

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: **EASY**

WAS IT TROMBONE? NO, TROUBADOR. AND ONE OF THE O's WAS A ZERO?

AND THERE WAS SOME SYMBOL...

DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: **HARD**



~44 BITS OF ENTROPY

$2^{44} = 550 \text{ YEARS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: **HARD**

THAT'S A BATTERY STAPLE.

CORRECT!

DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: YOU'VE ALREADY MEMORIZED IT

THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

<https://xkcd.com/936/>

Where to put the public key, and how

- Standard environment: transfer public key to server


```
$ ssh-copy-id -i ~/.ssh/mykey.pub user@host
```

- Public key added to
`~/.ssh/authorized_keys`

- NHR@FAU: Upload SSH key to HPC Portal

<https://doc.nhr.fau.de/hpc-portal/#the-user-tab>

- Give it two hours to distribute to all systems



The screenshot shows the HPC-Portal user interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the NHR@FAU logo and links for Home, User, Management, Advisor, and Support. The main content area is titled 'Public SSH keys'. It features a green '+ Add new SSH key' button with an information icon, and a dropdown menu set to 'MD5'. Below this is a table with columns for 'Actions', 'Alias', and 'Fingerprint (MD5)'. The table contains one entry with the alias '4k_2020' and a fingerprint '50:95:0d:63:34:45:d9:fd:70:99:80:0a:38:6e:30:a2'. The 'Actions' column for this entry has edit and delete icons. At the bottom of the page, there are two blue buttons: 'Go to ClusterCockpit' and 'Go to JupyterHub'.

Actually logging in with a private key

- Example:

```
mylaptop$ ssh unrz55@fritz.nhr.fau.de
Enter passphrase for key '/home/unrz55/.ssh/id_rsa':
[...massive babble...]
unrz55@fritz3:~ $
```

- Can add explicit private key with “-i <keyfile>”
- Use option “-X” for X11 forwarding
 - Display GUI through SSH connection
 - Probably painful over DSL/Cable
 - Better use **remote desktop options**, especially if you are outside FAU
 - <https://doc.nhr.fau.de/access/nx/> (phasing out)
 - <https://doc.nhr.fau.de/access/xrdp/> (the new sh!t)

Transferring files

- Built-in command: **scp**

- To target:

- \$ **scp** [-r] [-p] <local_source> target_host:[path]

- From target:

- \$ **scp** [-r] [-p] target_host:[path] <local_target>

- Example:

- \$ **scp -r -p iwst345h@fritz.nhr.fau.de:work/*.dat ~/data**

Recurse
into subdirs

Preserve mod. times
and permissions

Remote
wildcard

- GUI frontends

- WinSCP

- MobaXterm file browser

- ...

Making your life easier: SSH agent

- SSH agent is a service daemon that **remembers your private keys**
- Usually started by desktop environment
- Adding a **specific key** to the agent (lifetime **1 day**):

```
$ ssh-add -t 86400 ~/.ssh/id_rsa_laptop
```
- In the following, no passphrase is necessary for login
- **Agent forwarding** enables passphrase-free logins out from the remote host
 - No need to deploy private keys remotely (only public keys necessary)
- **Caveat:** Authentication can be hijacked and is forwarded to a potentially untrusted remote environment

Our advice: Do not use agent forwarding!



Making your life easier: the ssh config file

- Location: `~/.ssh/config`
- Allows to create shortcuts to hosts and adjust ssh settings per host
Documentation: `$ man ssh_config`

- Example entry:

```
Host csnhr
```

```
ForwardAgent no
```

```
ForwardX11 no
```

```
HostName csnhr.nhr.fau.de
```

```
User unrz55
```

```
IdentityFile /home/unrz55/.ssh/id_rsa_laptop
```

Proxy Jump

- Proxy jump enables login through a “jump host”
- The connection is tunneled through the jump host but the connection to final target host is made by the initial client
- Necessary for logins to NHR@FAU systems from outside FAU if no VPN or IPv6 is available

- Basic use:



```
$ ssh -J unrz55@csnhr.nhr.fau.de unrz55@fritz.nhr.fau.de
Enter passphrase for key '/home/pi/.ssh/id_rsa':
Enter passphrase for key '/home/pi/.ssh/id_rsa':
unrz55@fritz:~ $
```

Suggested SSH config for Proxy Jump

- Full config: <https://doc.nhr.fau.de/access/ssh-command-line/?h=proxy+jump#template-for-connecting-to-hpc-systems>


```
Host csnhr.nhr.fau.de
  HostName csnhr.nhr.fau.de
  User <HPC account>
  IdentityFile ~/.ssh/<your_private_key>
  IdentitiesOnly yes
  PasswordAuthentication no
  PreferredAuthentications publickey
  ForwardX11 no
  ForwardX11Trusted no
```

If this is all Greek to you, use VPN
(or a GUI session on csnhr)!

```
Host alex.nhr.fau.de
  HostName alex.nhr.fau.de
  User <HPC account>
  ProxyJump csnhr.nhr.fau.de
  IdentityFile ~/.ssh/<your_private_key>
  IdentitiesOnly yes
  PasswordAuthentication no
  PreferredAuthentications publickey
  ForwardX11 no
  ForwardX11Trusted no
```

Security hints for SSH clients

- Keep the private key files secret!
 - If possible, put private keys only on trusted hosts
- Use a “long enough” key protected by a passphrase
- Use a strong passphrase (at least 15 characters long)
- Use a separate key for every client
- Disable Agent Forwarding and X11 Forwarding in config
- Do not leave open external logins in running tmux/screen
- Keep your SSH client installation up to date



Some hints for NHR@FAU HPC systems

- Your **home** directory is an **NFS share**
 - **Special care** w.r.t. private keys required
 - Take care of **proper permission settings**

- **Recommendation: Use a dedicated key pair** for NHR@FAU-internal logins
 - Mostly hostkey based anyway
 - Do not use this key to login anywhere else

What we have left out

- **Managing passphrases** and passwords
 - Password managers: KeePass, Pass, gopass, ...
- General **port forwarding** through SSH connections
 - “Poor man’s VPN”
 - `$ ssh -L 8888:proxy:80 unrz55@cshpc`
- **SSHFS**
 - Mounting remote file systems over SSH connections
 - `$ sshfs -o <options> cshpc:/home/vault/unrz/unrz55 ~/vault`
- Graphical **remote desktops**
 - XRDP via csnhr
 - <https://doc.nhr.fau.de/access/xrdp/>